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Capital punishment - and specifically public execution - is here investigated not simply as 
a judicial punishment, but as a lens through which to view the civil and socio-political 
development of Malawi, through the colonial to early independence eras. Most 
scholarship treats the death penalty as a mechanism of social control, or explains its 
evolution through discourses of ‘civilisation’. This article focuses rather on the politics of 
capital punishment. Public executions in Malawi were an exceptional measure, employed 
at times of marked social and political unrest, being ordered by the colonial government 
in response to the Chilembwe Uprising in 1915, and by Prime Minister Banda in 1965  in 
the aftermath of the cabinet crisis and Chipembere Uprising.  The continuities, as well as 
the changes, displayed in the practise and signification of these judicial killings, and the 
debates that surrounded them, highlight the tensions inherent in state rule between the 
‘process of civilisation’ and ‘good governance’ both in  domestic and international 
perspective, and the perceived necessity of ‘violence’ in maintaining control and order. 
Negotiations between Britain and the Malawian government surrounding the 1966 
hanging of Medson Silombela - for murder during the Chipembere Uprising - reveal how 
international and domestic political considerations interacted with legal and moral 
arguments  to shape the form of his execution, with the case becoming a symbol of race 
relations in Britain, and social order in Malawi.      
 
In 1960, as part of its investigation into genocide and inhumane punishments, the United 
Nations sent a questionnaire to every member country inquiring about its policy on 
capital punishment. The Malawian government in its response stated confidently that: 
„All executions are in private, and always have been since Nyasaland became a British 
Protectorate‟. 1  They were mistaken. The question of public executions had arisen 
repeatedly since the establishment of Nyasaland in 1892, and subsequently in 
independent Malawi. Indeed, it became most controversial after Independence when in 
1965 Prime Minister Hastings Banda amended legislation to allow the public execution 
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of Medson Evans Silombela, a high-ranking rebel who had been convicted of murdering 
a Malawi Congress Party chairman during the revolt led by the former Education 
Minister, Henry Chipembere. Banda‟s public comments that „I know that you will want 
to see him swinging from a pole. Whatever happens, his swinging must be public. I want 
him to dangle there until he breathes his last‟, made whilst the case was still sub judice, 
outraged the British media and international humanitarian sentiment.
2
 The Scotsman 
described them as a „reversion to primitive barbarity‟, damaging not only to Banda‟s 
reputation, but to the whole cause of African nationalism and race relations more 
generally.
3
 What was so controversial about allowing people to witness the execution of a 
„self-confessed murderer‟, particularly considering the waves of violence and controversy 
erupting elsewhere in Africa?
4
 Executions had been a favourite form of citizenship 
lessons and entertainment for the masses across history, particularly in England, until the 
mid-nineteenth century. At that time, a combination of changing cultural sensibilities and 
politico-legal strategies re-created the public execution as a symbol of barbarity and a site 
of scandal in many western nations, with public executions being abolished in Britain in 
1868.
5
 To understand the controversy behind public executions it is necessary to address 
both the changing meaning and performance of capital punishment in Malawi, and the 
tensions between governments and public opinion – domestic and international – from 
the early colonial to the Independence era.  
* 
* * 
The death penalty should not be seen simply as a judicial punishment, but as a lens 
through which to view social and civil development. Most scholarship focuses on capital 
punishment as a mechanism of social control, or seeks to explain its evolution through 
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discourses of „civilisation‟.6 Whilst these approaches are illuminating, this article rather 
emphasizes the political nature of capital punishment and how it relates to a wider field 
of social defence – to the establishment of social cohesion, and the strategies of violence 
employed by states to assist this.
7
 There has been relatively little historical study of 
capital punishment in Africa, although there is a growing debate on punishment and 
colonial penality in the continent.
8
 As David Anderson suggests „State execution is a 
mighty weapon, and in the colonial context it has generally been used sparingly‟.9  Why 
is this? Capital punishment, like flogging, was a violent punishment antithetical to 
civilized sensibilities and seen as „simultaneously humane, necessary and a problem‟ by 
many colonial officials.
10
 It reflected the contradictions inherent in colonial modes of 
governance, particularly as  – unlike other legal penalties – it had an expressly political 
element. The final decision in any execution lay not with a judge, but with the governor, 
and, after independence, with the Prime Minister of a territory. Looking at the political 
nature of the death penalty entails investigating for what reason, and in what manner, 
executions were carried out. What meanings and signs were intended by an execution, 
and how were these received by different audiences? The interaction of evolving ideas 
about „civilisation‟ and „violence‟ are crucial in this regard.11 Notions of punishment in 
Africa were intimately linked to concepts of „civilisation‟, „justice‟ and „good 
governance‟ in the colonial period, but also to the necessity of violence in the control and 
operation of the state.
12
 The question is, at what point did the humanity and „decorum‟ 
required by „civilisation‟ give way to the violence necessary for „deterrence‟, and vice-
versa?   
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The real issue of capital punishment in this context is not the violence used, 
but the form which it takes and the extent to which this impinges upon public 
sensibilities.
13
 An execution is a complex interaction of discourses of deterrence, 
retribution, law and control, underlining the state‟s power to punish and reinforcing its 
claim to a monopoly of violence.
14 The colonial period saw an evolution in the practise 
and rituals of capital punishment, as it was transformed from a public symbol of British 
power to a sanitized judicial murder. Methods of execution were based on British models 
but reflected evolving sensibilities and structures of government in colonial territories. 
During early colonization executions were normally carried out by firing squads, but in 
Nyasaland hangings had been preferred almost from the outset. They were proposed as 
the most „humane and decorous manner‟ of execution.15 With the development of state 
and legal structures, hangings evolved from simply consisting of a rope thrown over a 
tree to becoming the culmination of a long process of sentencing and appeal, sanitized 
and routinized affairs conducted on specially constructed gallows and following strict 
British procedures, with the condemned man bound and his head covered to save the 
colonial officers from viewing his dying breaths. However, in practise, as many hangings 
were carried out on temporary scaffolds by inexperienced district officers, sometimes 
lacking the proper ropes and equipment, they were often neither humane, efficient nor 
„decorous‟, and judicial and administrative officers frequently expressed concern about 
such mishandled deaths. The practise of holding hangings in district prisons was 
abolished in 1924 after the badly botched execution of two Africans, Jim and 
Makoshonga, left one to be hanged twice and the other shot in the head after being taken 
down whilst still alive.
16
 This tension between the power implied by the ritual of 
execution and its often ad hoc manifestation is a good analogy for the colonial state itself.  
It was the ritual and ceremony of a hanging however that remained crucial to 
conveying the death penalty‟s message of British power, order and the necessity of 
obeying the law. Execution procedures in Nyasaland were reformed according to the 
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dictates of „civilisation‟, but also in order to legitimate the continued application of the 
physical violence viewed as necessary for control. The centralization of executions in 
British Africa between the 1920s and 1930s was supposed to ensure that hangings were 
carried out in the „humane‟ and „efficient‟ method required by English procedures, but it 
also significantly altered their meaning and reception by privatizing the event. In 
Nyasaland, prior to centralization, executions had been attended by all adult male 
witnesses from the murder trial and members of the condemned man‟s village in order to 
maximise the deterrent impact. This combined the visually symbolic deterrent effect, 
deemed necessary to imprint British power and law on African minds, alongside 
concordance with English law, constituting what is best described as a „semi-private‟ 
system of execution.
17
 But, for many British colonial officials in Africa, public 
executions were increasingly regarded as „barbaric‟, „inhumane‟ and „uncivilised‟.18 The 
Colonial Office categorically refused to accept public executions – namely those carried 
out close to the condemned man‟s home or the scene of the crime, and before local 
witnesses. It deemed such events as „opposed to the ordinary dictates of humanity‟, and 
condemned any case brought to its attention, as in Kenya (1907, 1923), Oron, Nigeria 
(1919), and Hoima in Uganda (1932).
19
 The fact that there was no rebuke for the colonial 
government in Zomba, Nyasaland‟s capital city, indicates that London was probably 
unaware of its use of African witnesses. Changing attitudes among officials in Nyasaland 
meant that, after 1924, the practise of ordering African witnesses to view hangings was 
rejected as „contrary to all principles of decency and decorum‟. 20  The reform of 
executions in Nyasaland however, as across Africa, was neither linear nor uncontested. 
Public executions were illegal under British law, but in Africa the strictures of the law 
were often ignored, and in times of social unrest many colonial governments reverted to 
exemplary public hangings to demonstrate British power and shore up their authority. 
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During the Chilembwe Uprising in Nyasaland in 1915, the death sentence was passed on 
forty-six men, thirty-six actually being executed.
21
 To increase the deterrent effect some 
of these men were hanged on the main Mlanje road near a station where a government 
askari (soldier or policeman) was killed, and others were executed by a firing squad 
rather than wait for portable gallows to be constructed.
22
  
* 
* * 
Methods of execution were as bound up in the politics of colonial and African society, in 
social defence and race relations, as they were with changing sensibilities towards the 
public infliction of pain upon the body of the criminal.
23
 After Independence, it was the 
aftermath of the Chipembere Uprising in 1965 that re-awoke the controversy of public 
execution in Malawi. Medson Evans Silombela was convicted in November 1965 of the 
murder of Ali John Mbawa, the Malawi Congress Party Chairman of Nyambi, Kasupe 
District. Silombela was a fifty-year-old former garage mechanic, held by Banda‟s 
government to have been a lieutenant to Henry Chipembere, the former Education 
Minister. Whilst in the run-up to Independence, Dr Banda had seemed supreme in his 
position as the leader of Nyasaland‟s people, a mere seven weeks after Independence on 
6 July 1964, the underlying conflicts within the Banda government over the President‟s 
increasingly dictatorial style of rule erupted in a „ministers‟ revolt‟. 24  Led by Henry 
Chipembere, once the man who helped establish Banda as Malawi‟s messianic first 
President but now Banda‟s greatest enemy, by October the political crisis had unfolded  
into violence as government forces sought to hunt down the rebels and their supporters, 
before erupting in February as Chipembere launched a failed coup d‟état. Wide popular 
support and dogged resistance by Chipembere‟s followers in Malindi district escalated 
the conflict before government forces gained the upper hand  and Chipembere was forced 
to flee to safety in America (with Banda‟s tacit support) and the uprising petered out. The 
ministers‟ revolt, although a relatively modest event in itself, became a seminal event in 
Malawi‟s history. Banda‟s suppression of the opposition led not only to the decimation of 
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the political leadership, but thousands of people were forced into exile for up to thirty 
years. Families were split, and hundreds – if not thousands – of Banda‟s opponents were 
herded into detention camps and brutally treated. Hopes for a democratic transition of 
power were dashed, whilst the tensions inherent in Malawian society exploded into 
public and international view, leading Britain to question its support of Banda.
25
  After 
Silombela‟s capture in November, Prime Minister Banda asserted repeatedly that he 
wanted everyone to see Silombela hang, and then implemented legislative change to 
allow this to occur. Both British and international humanitarian observers were outraged. 
Editorials in the British press questioned Banda‟s actions:  
How could Dr Banda, the contemporary realist, the sophisticated admirer of the 
traditional values of the British Commonwealth and the monarchy, lend himself 
to a deliberate reversion to primitive barbarity? Why should he give such 
ammunition to the enemies of African nationalism? ... Is Dr Banda pandering 
for expediency, but with personal distaste, to the more primitive appetites of his 
people?  Or does he genuinely believe ... that justice must not only be done, but 
be seen to be done, by people who will trust only the evidence of their own 
eyes?
26
 
 
Britain was in a morally and politically ambivalent position in relation to the use of 
capital punishment in Africa. As a colonial power she had long utilised the death penalty, 
receiving particular criticism during the Malayan, Cyprus and Mau Mau Emergencies.
27
 
However, less than a week after Banda‟s „see Silombela swing‟ comments, on 9 
November, the British Parliament passed the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) 
Act, which suspended capital punishment for murder, following a prolonged domestic 
campaign.
28
 The British government had also campaigned against the mandatory death 
sentences passed under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act in Southern Rhodesia 
between 1962 and 65.
29
 As a result, both the international community and British public 
expected the government to intervene in Silombela‟s case. However, the government was 
in the difficult position of being held responsible for a situation over which it had no real 
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legal or constitutional power. Despite Britain retaining a residual prerogative of mercy in 
former colonies, it was against practise and procedure for either the colonial secretary or 
the Queen to intervene in decisions of execution or commutation.
30
 Only the governor 
could exercise mercy, but as Malawi was an independent country governor-general Sir 
Glyn Jones could only follow the prime minister‟s advice, and Banda was not about to 
grant Silombela a reprieve. Jones found himself powerless to deny Banda‟s wishes, 
although he informed the colonial office that he personally found the idea of public 
executions repugnant.
31
 Jones could not resign as his good personal relations with Banda 
were crucial for securing his support against Southern Rhodesia in the aftermath of the 
Universal Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965, which had seen Ian 
Smith‟s Rhodesian Front government repudiate British overrule in order to retain white 
minority rule, as Britain refused to grant independence until majority rule by Southern 
Rhodesia‟s African population had been allowed.32 Rhodesian „independence‟ became 
Britain‟s most severe and damaging colonial crisis. The idea of using British aid as a 
bargaining tool was rejected as it was felt too serious to break with Banda, a necessary 
ally against Rhodesia and deemed an otherwise moderate, anti-Communist African 
leader, „merely because after a fair trial a multi-murderer is to be hung in public rather 
than in prison‟.33 The British government was also placed in an ambivalent position 
because it had unobtrusively supported Chipembere and secured his escape to America, 
via Southern Rhodesia, after the uprising had failed.
34
 But what really restricted Britain‟s 
moral leverage was the fact that Banda and his supporters adopted the very arguments 
and discourses of deterrence that the colonial goverment had used previously to justify its 
own public and semi-public executions, although they deployed a more forceful rhetoric 
stemming from a desire for retribution rather than order.   
Banda received wide backing for his position during the Parliamentary debate on 10 
November 1965 regarding the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill to allow public execution, 
with African ministers being vociferous and lurid in their support. Minister A. W. 
Mawambungu, himself wounded in a rebel raid, declared: „If I had any power myself, 
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these people would not even be tried. They would just be hanged dead in a public place 
like the Central stadium. I wish they were not to be hanged too quickly. It is easy to burn 
the toes somehow‟.35 Minister E. Banda, from the Ministry of Community and Social 
Development, proclaimed: „Before they are dead they should be skinned as rabbits so that 
their skins should be used as carpets. We should send them to our Malawi museum‟.36 
Other speakers gave Biblical and customary precedents for public killings. Even the 
European Opposition Leader, Michael Blackwood gave his tentative support to the Bill:  
 
I have tried to picture what would be the position in England, say, if they had 
suffered a rebellion, and raiders had come down from the Welsh mountains 
into the local villages, killing, burning, looting and so on...I am far from 
certain that there would not be cries of “string „em up”. I am not by any means 
certain that what has been suggested is not right in the circumstances which 
exist in Malawi.
37
 
 
Most disturbingly for the British, Home Affairs Minister Richard Chidzanja stated: „It is 
a repitition of the history of what the British did in this country‟.38 And he was largely 
right. Banda himself asserted that the British had no right to criticise his decision, as they 
themselves had employed public executions recently during Mau Mau and in Sierra 
Leone, accusations that the colonial office confidently denied, while frantically sending 
officials out to check if they were true.
39
 The fact that they did not know is a perfect 
illustration of London‟s ad hoc approach to colonial justice. In fact, Glyn Jones 
confirmed that „public executions have been carried out in certain parts of British Africa 
since I joined the Colonial Service in 1931‟.40 In 1965 Banda argued for re-introducing 
public execution as follows:  
It was essential that as many people as wanted should actually see a dangerous 
criminal such as Silombela die…The deterrent effect on other potential 
murderers and traitors: this was a very important consideration…41 
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He railed against British hypocrisy, stating: „You can‟t judge others by your own 
standards, because your own standards were built up under different circumstances from 
those under which we live now‟. This was the very argument of African exceptionality 
that colonial officials had themselves used to justify public or semi-private executions, 
articulated now from a belief in the speaker‟s political and ethnic predominance rather 
than racism.
42
  
Investigations by the British High Commission in Zomba appeared to confirm 
general support for Silombela‟s execution. Although the opinion of ordinary Africans is 
hard to gauge, the argument in The Malawi News that „[u]nder our own laws before the 
British came, if a man killed your relative, you had the right to take a knob-kerry, shield 
and spear and kill that man without a fuss‟ was probably reflective of many people‟s 
attitudes.
43
 Strong calls were made by both government officials and sections of the 
public to hold the execution at either Silombela‟s village or the central stadium in 
Blantyre to enhance deterrence and to „dispel current beliefs that he had either not been 
captured or was immune to death at human hands‟. The British high commissioner 
argued that educated Africans „whilst they would not themselves make a point of 
watching the execution…do not doubt its virtue as a cathartic for the feelings of the 
people, particularly those who have directly suffered from the depredations of 
Silombela‟.44 It should be noted however, that the official report submitted to assist the 
decision on mercy stated that local opinion in Silombela‟s home village was against the 
death sentence as he was the only remaining son of an elderly mother.
45
 Among the white 
population there was a general feeling that Banda had found an African answer to an 
African problem. Many, and particularly those who remembered British public 
executions, held that Africans needed to see justice done, otherwise they would believe 
the convicted man had „turned into a hyena‟ or been „sent to work in the mines in South 
Africa‟.46 They accepted Banda‟s political strategy and knowledge of his people, and 
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only a minority feared this measure would „breed more violence and lessen the value of 
human life‟.47 
Sensibilities may change and become more „civilised‟, but these alterations are 
not total or unilinear. Certain forms of violence remain legitimate under certain 
circumstances, particularly for social defence in times of unrest. The support from 
Malawian ministers and the general public for public execution is not an indication that 
they were more „blood-thirsty‟ or „primitive‟ than other peoples, but rather that they 
perceived their social order to be under threat, and were able to draw on pre-existing 
discourses and collective memories of punishment in order to re-establish internal 
security. Although the prosecution and media depicted Silombela as a monster, he was 
made an example of not as a murderer – his crime was not exceptional in form or level of 
violence – but as a rebel, as a threat to the government and its social order.48  
Despite the suspension in 1965 of capital punishment for murder in Britain, and 
campaigns against Southern Rhodesia‟s use of mandatory death sentences, what British 
officials both in London and Zomba opposed was not the execution itself, but simply its 
public nature.
49
 Although the colonial government had employed public and semi-private 
executions in Nyasaland, there had also been a considerable tradition of mercy in its 
deployment of the death penalty and an emphasis on „justice‟ and a „fair trial‟. It was this 
conflicting inheritance that formed the background to the Silombela case. During the trial 
Silombela‟s supporters had protested that public discussion of the case prejudiced his 
chances of a fair trial. Allegations were made that police brutality had been used to 
extract a confession from Silombela, but both the presiding judge, Justice Cram, and the 
appeal judge, Chief Justice Southworth, stressed that his trial had been fair and that there 
was no „doubt at all that the appellant is guilty of a deliberate and cold blooded 
murder.‟50 
Governor-General Jones, reporting on a petition for mercy sent to the Queen, 
emphasised that:  
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Silombela is deserving of no sympathy; in a confession produced at trial he 
admitted to eight murders. Nevertheless, he has been accorded all the 
advantages which the British system of justice confers upon a person accused 
of crime. Contrary to the allegations of the Petitioners he will not be subject to 
any inhuman or degrading punishment for the offence of which he has been 
found guilty.
51
 
Petitioning the Queen was a deliberate tactic of Silombela‟s defence, aimed to raise 
international awareness of his plight. In appropriating British discourses in which 
„justice‟ and the „rule of law‟ were two of the fundamental boons granted to Africans by 
colonial rule, they appealed to Britain to fulfil its role of guarantor of these principles 
within the Commonwealth.  
In response to such appeals, British officials stressed repeatedly that the matter was 
exclusively of concern to the Malawian government. The high commissioner wrote: „it is 
not for the British Government to disapprove the public execution as such‟, but he also 
noted that Banda should not underestimate public opinion on the matter in Britain, or the 
spectre of negative international opinion. In Britain itself, however, the government 
sought to restrict public knowledge of Silombela‟s plight. The high commissioner feared 
that the execution might damage race relations, and he warned that „any example of 
African barbarism at this stage would add grist to the Rhodesian mill‟.52 When liberal 
party leader Jo Grimond, a frequent anti-colonial campaigner, enquired „whether it would 
be in the public interest to put down a question in the House [of Commons] on this 
matter‟, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, 
dissuaded him from doing so.
53
 Part of the difficulty faced by officials was that although 
they were negotiating the grounds of a particular legal case, Silombela‟s conviction could 
not be treated in isolation from wider events and sentiments.
54
 Unlike the Malawian 
government which stressed Silombela‟s position as a rebel leader, British officials were 
apt to regard him as „a pathological case‟. 55  One telegram from the British High 
Commission in Zomba stated that:  
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[I]n many places Silombela would have been tortured and disappeared; is it 
then a “barbarity” to try and execute him? Indeed in a world where the most 
appalling atrocities are taking place daily, Banda will no doubt claim that we 
are being unduly sensitive, and perhaps prejudiced by current feeling against 
all capital punishment in Britain.
56
 
 
Both the international community and African leaders put further pressure on Banda. 
The case was raised in the United Nations, and petitions were sent from Zambia to the 
Queen by former Minister Gray Fundi and five hundred other Malawian exiles.
57
 Kwame 
Nkrumah, President of Ghana and Banda‟s long-standing friend, wrote asking him to 
reprieve Silombela „purely on humanitarian grounds‟. This plea was repeated by the 
Ghanaian High Commissioner to Malawi during an audience with Banda. Banda refused 
to back down, arguing:  
The inhabitants of Fort Johnston District are predominantly Muslims and their 
belief in absurdities is profound. During the uprising in Malawi, Mr 
Chipembere ... had, through his agents managed to propagate the idea that he 
and his army commanders had medicine that made them invisible… I want to 
give them a practical demonstration that Chipembere and his henchmen are not 
superhuman beings. 
The Commissioner reported to Nkrumah that he found Banda‟s insistence on public 
execution „disquieting‟. „This will be a horrible execution‟, he wrote.58 The Malawian 
security forces had already hanged one man from a mango tree in Fort Johnston District, 
mistakenly believing him to be Silombela.
59
  
Private negotiations between the British High Commission and Banda‟s 
government in Zomba were Britain‟s main method of exerting pressure on Malawi. The 
policy seemed to be working when Banda stated in a fraught meeting with Attorney-
General Roberts that „[p]erhaps we might have a public hanging in prison‟, only to 
renege the next day.
60
 British officials stressed repeatedly the damaging impact of 
adverse international opinion on Malawi, and the fact that erecting the proper gallows 
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outside of prison would take some two days work, giving the media and public ample 
forewarning of the event, and allowing uncontrollable levels of crowds and interest to 
generate. Perhaps it was the suggestion by two of his Ministers, Richard Chidzanja and 
Gomile Kumtumanji, that no such preparation was required since „it was only necessary 
to string Silombela up from a tree‟, that really made Banda question the legitimacy and 
impact of his decision.
61
  
The execution negotiations revealed much about attitudes towards public and state 
violence and about the importance of „justice‟ to state legitimacy. Britain‟s first priority 
in these negotiations was to ensure a humane execution: meaning a properly constructed 
scaffold and the employment of the Rhodesian professional executioner, Mr Catchpole. 
However, Banda insisted that if Catchpole „set it up‟, African prison officials could 
complete the job. It was to be a Malawian, not a European, hand that exacted justice. In 
the end, Catchpole conducted the execution but was screened from the audience, who 
only saw his African assistant. The second priority for Britain was that „law and order‟ 
had to be maintained.  The crowd was to be controlled, by police force if necessary, and 
any attempt to desecrate the body was to be prevented. Britain‟s official third priority, but 
the first conceded by Malawi in negotiations, was the non-involvement of any British 
officer. Britain could not be seen as in anyway condoning the execution, even if privately 
her officers had come to accept it as expedient.
62
 
Under British and international pressure, Banda conceded to Roberts‟s 
suggestions and accepted that the execution be held in Zomba prison with only 400 to 
450 witnesses.63 These included victim‟s relatives and many from Silombela‟s village, 
who were not informed beforehand they would witness the execution in order to limit 
press awareness and prevent large crowds from gathering. Witnesses were merely told to 
gather at Zomba airfield, ostensibly to hear a speech by Banda. They were then collected 
in army trucks and driven to the site, which must have been unnerving for many.
64 
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Although maximum deterrence was sought through public exposure, the event was to be 
tightly controlled. Journalists were refused admission to the site, no photos were allowed, 
and the police were given authority to smash any cameras found. In addition, the gallows 
were screened off by corrugated iron, with the condemned men dropping out of sight as 
the trap opened.65 When Silombela went to his death at 7 a.m., 1 February 1966, what 
was used was a system of semi-public execution, very similar to that employed by the 
colonial government decades earlier. The didactic symbolism of public execution was 
prioritized, reassuring the people that their government was doing its duty in punishing 
rebels and protecting order, but concepts of „civilised‟ and „humane‟ governance were 
not ignored; deterrence would have to co-exist, if uneasily, with decorum. 
* 
** 
The death of one man, as a murderer and a rebel, became a symbol around which 
Banda‟s government attempted to re-establish social order and authority, whilst Britain 
attempted to defend its reputation as the seat of „justice‟ for former colonies against its 
increasingly contentious political position in Southern and Central Africa. The 
negotiations over Silombela‟s execution were played out against the background of the 
Rhodesian crisis, and to a lesser extent, the abolition of capital punishment in Britain; the 
hanging of an African was seen by Britain as a race relations issue rather than relating to 
the general morality of the death penalty. The story of capital punishment in colonial and 
independent Malawi highlights the continuities in strategies of order and political control. 
The death penalty remained the supreme habitus of a state‟s power over its recalcitrant 
subjects, but that power was never total, being refracted through the lens of race and 
restricted by the states‟ own need for legitimacy constituted through its subjects, and 
overseen by international opinion. The uneasy relationship between government and its 
right to kill would appear to be borne out in the Malawian archival and official memory 
of Silombela‟s hanging, with only one incomplete trial record to be found in the Zomba 
archives. The meaning and practise of execution in Malawi was dictated not just by 
attitudes towards crime, order, violence and the infliction of pain, but by the politics of 
state rule, be it in colonial or African hands.  
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